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The quality of institutions and their impact on economic development is an important ￿eld in
economic inquiry, and the literature on intellectual property rights (IPRs) and innovation can be
viewed as a sub ￿eld. Much of the existing literature on intellectual property rights predicts that
these institutions may have di￿erent (perhaps negative) e￿ects on developing economies than on rich
countries (e.g. Higino-Schneider 2005; Maskus 2000; Helpman 1993; Grossman and Lai 2005). In an
extension of the work of Aghion and Howitt (1992), we model interactions between the institutional
setting and innovation in the presence of costly imitation. We derive a set of predictions about
the relationship between the level of research and development expenditures (R&D), human capital
and IPRs. The subsequent econometric evidence rejects linear and separable functional forms,
which is consistent with the model predictions. The evidence thus suggests that poor countries may
accumulate human capital without a corresponding increase in the incidence of R&D as a share of
national income without strengthening IPRs.
One longstanding strand of the literature on institutions and innovation focuses on the optimal
design of IPRs, taking into account tradeo￿s between the provision of information that can help
spur future innovations while providing inventors an institutional solution to their appropriability
problem. Nordhaus (1969, Chapter 5) provided an early contribution, which focused on the policy
maker’s concern about raising social welfare through the design of IPRs. A more recent literature
on the optimal design of IPRs is rooted in the idea of cumulative or sequential innovation, whereby
new innovations produce the ideas for future innovations. Hopenhayn et al. (2006) is an example
of recent theoretical treatments in this vein. Throughout this literature, ￿rms are characterized
only in terms of the pro￿ts received from innovations, and the optimal patent design depends on
the breadth and scope of innovation. However, the decision to innovate or imitate is not modeled
explicitly.
An important e￿ort to incorporate the decision to imitate by ￿rms is Gallini (1992), who consid-
ers the e￿ect of costly imitation on the optimal patent length. However, in this framework there is
no imitation when the patent length is optimal. This is due to uniformity of patent lengths within a
class of patents that supposedly ￿ts all innovations, when in fact the optimal patent length depends
on technological parameters that vary across goods. More recently, Jim and Troege (2006) pro-
posed a model in which ￿rms decide simultaneously how much to innovate and imitate (through a
spillover-absorption coe￿cient) in a Cournot setting, but institutions play no role in shaping invest-
ment decisions. We depart from previous literature by taking patent length as given and allowing
simultaneously costly imitation and innovation. In addition, we explicitly model the role of IPRs
in determining the incentives of ￿rms to choose between innovation and imitation.
There is a literature on the role of IPRs in economic development. This literature has mainly
1focused on North-South patterns of trade associated with di￿erent IPR regimes and the associated
welfare gains or losses (Grossman and Helpman 1991; Helpman 1993). Zigic (1998) explores situa-
tions where leakages due to imperfect IPRs might produce counter-intuitive results. For example,
spillovers might make the strengthening of IPRs in the South bene￿cial for the welfare of developing
economies as R&D in the North rises, with subsequent positive spillovers for the South in the form
of pro￿t leakages from pro￿ts driven by scale. An interesting feature of most of these models of
international technology di￿usion is that developing countries are characterized as only having ￿rms
involved in imitation, and the ￿rm-level decision about whether to innovate or imitate is ignored.
Firms in the developed North decide how much to spend in R&D, but the option of imitation is not
considered, and thus these models are silent with respect to economic structure within countries.
Grossman and Lai (2005) extend traditional models by considering a two-country setup with costless
imitation, enforcement and national treatment of patents. Unlike other models, in Grossman and
Lai (2005) Southern countries are allowed to innovate. They study optimal patent policies for coun-
tries engaged in trade. Their main results establish that the bene￿ts from IPRs rise with market
size and human capital. Thus, considering that Northern countries have larger markets and greater
capacity to innovate, it follows that they have stronger incentives to strengthen IPRs compared to
Southern countries. However, the enforcement of patents is modeled as a constant probability that
a￿ects the instantaneous monopolistic pro￿ts; neither risk nor the process of enforcement of IPRs
is considered.
More recently, Branstetter and Saggi (2009) explored the relationship between IPRs and for-
eign direct investment (FDI). In their model, the South imitates, but imitation is endogenously
determined as is FDI in a North-South model. The strengthening of IPRs in the South reduces
imitation and FDI increases. More importantly, FDI gains more than o￿set the decline in imita-
tion. In a previous model proposed by Chen and Puttitanum (2005), a Southern ￿rm is allowed
to imitate a foreign (Northern) product while another domestic ￿rm can carry out R&D activities
facing domestic competition. These authors study the optimal IPR regime through the course of
development. They model IPRs as the ability to imitate in an static setting without explicitly
modeling IPR structure. Their main ￿nding is that optimal IPRs follow a U-shaped function with
respect to income.
This article proposes a new modeling approach, based on Aghion and Howitt (1992), to un-
derstand observed patterns of R&D shares in national income across countries. The theoretical
contribution entails a model of two sectors that operate simultaneously with costly imitation and
innovation, where ￿rms decide endogenously whether to participate in innovative or imitative ac-
tivities. In contrast with the North-South literature, our model is a closed economy model. This
allows us to focus on and carefully model the enforcement of IPRs. The gains of modeling an open
economy would complicate the mathematical exposition and would change the focus of our model,
2which is to model the interactions between IPRs and human capital. The endogenous allocation
of ￿rms embodying human capital across sectors results in endogenous aggregate innovation and
imitation rates. We derive a set of results for the steady state equilibrium of our model; that is, for
constant allocations of human capital across sectors.
In contrast to Aghion and Howitt’s seminal contribution, we omit transitional dynamics. In
equilibrium, the enforcement of IPRs, through monitoring e￿ort and imposition of ￿nes, helps
determine the allocation of labor across these two sectors by a￿ecting the risk-adjusted relative
discount rate for innovators and imitators as well as the stream of pro￿ts. The discount rate a￿ects
the present value of labor productivity, which is also a￿ected by the fees and compensations derived
from the enforcement of the IPRs. A second result is that certain conditions are required to ensure
that an increase in the endowment of human capital increases the share of labor devoted to R&D
activities. This result is driven by inter-sector human capital mobility, and human capital will move
into innovation only if IPRs are strong enough. Perhaps more importantly, the model predicts that
aggregate R&D shares will depend on complex interactions between the quality of IPRs and human
capital endowments. In spite of this complex relationship, the model predicts that IPRs will have a
positive e￿ect on the incidence of R&D expenditures, and, under fairly nonrestrictive assumptions,
the marginal e￿ect of human capital depends on IPRs. Hence, with lax IPRs, the accumulation of
human capital may not raise the incidence of R&D.
The model yields a testable prediction, namely that the share of R&D expenditures in GDP is a
non-linear but positive function of IPRs and is generally a positive function of human capital. The
existing empirical literature, however, has focused exclusively on log-linear functions of R&D deter-
minants (e.g., Varsakelis 2001; Chen and Puttitanum 2005). We provide empirical tests of functional
linearity and separability of human capital and IPRs in an R&D model. The preponderance of the
evidence supports the theoretical model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section
3 discusses the empirical methodology, and section 4 discusses the econometric results. Section 5
concludes.
2 The Model
Our model is an extension of Aghion and Howitt (1992). However, instead of competition between
R&D activities and production, we present a trade-o￿ between R&D and illegal imitation. There
is one input, human capital, which is allocated between these two activities. Each person has one
unit of human capital and there are ET total units of human capital in the economy. Each person
is an entrepreneur who sets up a ￿rm and decides whether she will use her unit of human capital
in R&D or imitation activities, which can be interpreted as patent infringement.
3As in Aghion and Howitt (1992), innovation follows a Poisson process with a ￿ow probability
parameter  and exhibits constant returns to scale in the human capital dedicated to R&D. Illegal
imitation follows a Poisson process with ￿ow probability parameter parameter  and also exhibits
constant returns to scale in employed human capital. The randomness represents in one case the
success rate of an innovation, and in the other the success rate of reverse engineering per unit of
human capital. Given the additivity property of Poisson processes and the constant returns to
scale, for each sector the resulting stochastic processes will also follow a Poisson distribution with
a parameter that depends on the original ￿ow probability and the human capital allocated to each
sector. One crucial di￿erence between the two sectors is that in the innovation sector each innovator
must incur a ￿xed cost of infrastructure of magnitude K:1
The government enforces patent rights, and, for the sake of clarity, patents are in￿nitely lived.
We assume that the enforcement process follows a Poisson distribution with ￿ow probability p, which
represents the sampling probability for any given imitating ￿rm. There are also constant returns
to scale in government expenditure, x, which increases the e￿cacy of the enforcement process. The
government imposes a ￿ne of size F on imitating ￿rms that have not paid royalties. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume that the ￿ne is transferred to the innovating ￿rm, but the model predictions
would be una￿ected if the transfer is a fraction of the ￿ne. Another interpretation is that F is a
court-mandated transfer from the imitating to the innovative ￿rm.
With respect to industrial organization, we assume monopolistic rents for a ￿rm that has been
successful in developing R&D activities and whose invention has not been imitated. Once a ￿rm’s
invention has been imitated, the imitating and innovative ￿rms compete as a Cournot duopoly.
We assume Bertrand competition with the successive entry of imitating ￿rms, given similar cost
structures among them. These assumptions ensure that there is only one pro￿table imitating ￿rm.
We further assume that a monopolistic ￿rm enjoys an instantaneous monopolistic rent, M. In
the case of Cournot competition, both ￿rms get an instantaneous duopolistic rent of D. Finally,
the risk free interest rate in the economy is denoted by r.
2.1 Labor market equilibrium
In equilibrium, the wage or income of the ￿rm or entrepreneur is the same across sectors. Let V
represent the value of an invention. The wage (income) paid to the innovator (R&D) equals the
expected value of one hour of research:
WRD =   V (1)
Analogously, in the imitation sector the wage will be the expected value of one hour spent
1Imitation might also entail costs in infrastructure, but they tend to be smaller in relative terms than the cost of
innovation. See, for example, Mans￿eld et.al. (1981).
4in reverse engineering activities. Given that a product can be pro￿tably imitated only once, the
marginal product of human capital in this sector is:
WI =   I (2)
where I represents the value of an illegal imitation.
In equilibrium, wages are equalized across sectors and the labor market clears:
WRD = WI (3)
and
ERD + EI = ET (4)
where ERD, EI, and ET stand for the human capital employed in the R&D sector, imitating sector
and total human capital respectively. Thus, by using (3), we reduce equations (1) and (2) to just
one equation. Equation (4) completes a system of two equations and two unknowns, ERD and EI,
because V and I can be expressed as functions of exogenous parameters and ERD and EI, as shown
in the following section.
2.2 Expected value of innovation and imitation
With constant returns to scale in both sectors, the rates of success for each sector are given by:
Rate(innovation) =   ERD
Rate(illegal_imitation) =   EI
Note that in spite of the constant ￿ow probabilities, economy wide (aggregate) innovation and
imitation stochastic processes are determined in equilibrium by the human capital allocated to each
activity.
The respective Poisson processes are parametrized with those rates, and the expected present
value of pro￿ts for ￿rms in the R&D sector (characterized by either monopolistic or duopolistic











+EPV (F)   K
(5)
5The ￿rst two terms in (5) correspond to the expected present value from monopolistic and duopolis-
tic pro￿ts respectively. In these two terms, pro￿ts are weighted by the probability of successful
innovations, imitations and enforcement. In the ￿rst term, the higher the values of  and , the
lower the expected value of the monopolistic pro￿ts as the emergence of successful innovation or
imitation will end this stream of pro￿ts. In contrast, the second term, contains two e￿ects. The ￿rst
is analogous to the one already discussed for monopolistic pro￿ts, hence part of this second term
(within the right integral) decreases with  and . But there is a second e￿ect whereby expected
present value of R&D partially increases with  as the likelihood of imitation raises the probability
of a stream of duopolistic pro￿ts.
In sum, when the probability of a new innovation is high, existing innovations become obsolete
and thus monopolistic pro￿ts decline. When the probability of imitation increases, monopolistic
pro￿ts also decline, but the expected value of duopolistic pro￿ts partially increases with the prob-
ability of duopolistic competition, but also partially declines given that a second imitation ends
duopolistic competition. Finally, note that the ￿ow of duopolistic pro￿ts are conditioned by the
existence of a previous imitation and the presence of enforcement, px, hence the second term also
decreases with px.
The third and fourth terms in (5) correspond to the expected present value of the ￿ne or transfer
(EPV(F)) minus the ￿xed cost of R&D infrastructure, K. The solution of the previous integrals
show more clearly these e￿ects:
V =
M
r +   ERD +   EI
+
D  EI
(r +   ERD +   EI + px)(r +   ERD +   EI)
+EPV (F) K (6)
Equation (6) corresponds to the expected present value of the income ￿ow of a ￿rm in the R&D
sector discounted by a risk-adjusted interest rate for the case of monopolistic and duopolistic pro￿ts.
A ￿rm in the imitation sector faces the possibility of replacement of an innovation by a new
innovation or imitation, and the possibility that the stream of pro￿ts will be halted by the enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights, which we model as Poisson process with rate px. If the ￿rm is
caught imitating without paying royalties, the government imposes a ￿ne or transfer F. Thus, the
















The ￿rst term corresponds to the duopolistic pro￿ts, while the second term corresponds to the
expected present value of the ￿ne or transfer imposed on imitating ￿rms when property rights
are enforced. The enforcement rate, px, has two e￿ects on the expected present value of the ￿ne
(transfer). On the one hand it increases its present value by increasing the probability of occurrence
of a successful enforcement, but on the other hand it decreases the expected value by reducing the
probability of a duopoly and hence the possibility of having to pay the ￿ne. These two e￿ects can




(r +   ERD +   EI + px)(r +   ERD +   EI)
 
F    EI  px
(r +   ERD +   EI + px)2 (8)
This equation corresponds to the expected duopolistic pro￿ts of a ￿rm in the imitation sector,
discounted by a risk-adjusted interest rate, minus the expected value of the ￿ne (transfer) for illegal
imitation. From (8), we derive an expression of the expected present value of the transfer received





Wages or entrepreneur’s incomes are equalized across sectors in equilibrium. Considering that the
expected wages depend on the expected value of inventions and imitations, the wage equalization
condition can be re-written as follows:
M
r +   ERD +   EI
+
D  EI
(r +   ERD +   EI + px)(r +   ERD +   EI)
+ EPV (F)   K
=
D  EI
(r +   ERD +   EI + px)(r +   ERD +   EI)
 
F    EI  px
(r +   ERD +   EI + px)2
7which reduces to:
M
r +   ERD +   EI
+ 2
F    EI  px
(r +   ERD +   EI + px)2 = K (9)
Thus, equation (9) implicitly de￿nes ERD and EI.2
2.4 Comparative statics
Equilibrium across the two sectors requires the following assumptions:
Assumption 1. The relationship between the ￿xed cost of R&D, K, pro￿ts with zero innovation,
and pro￿ts with zero imitation must be the following:
M
r +   ET
+ 2
F    ET  px
(r +   ET + px)2 > K >
M
r +   ET
M
We also assume that there is no waste of public resources. This implies that the monitoring
sampling rate must be smaller that the e￿ective rate of innovation plus imitation:
Assumption 2. The monitoring sampling rate is smaller than the e￿ective rate of innovation plus
imitation.
  ET > px
For the sake of clarity regarding the e￿ect of IPRs on the marginal e￿ect of human capital
accumulation on the incidence of R&D, the innovation arrival rate is set to be equal to the imitation
arrival rate.
Assumption 3.  = 
To simplify the proof of the propositions discussed below we implicitly di￿erentiate the equi-
librium condition (9) with respect to the relevant variables imposing  =  and the equilibrium
condition ERD + EI = ET, after these steps in some cases we use again the equilibrium condition
to simplify the resulting expressions.
From the model we derive the following set of propositions and corollaries:
Proposition 1. A reduction in the risk-free discount rate increases the share of the labor force in
innovation activities.
2In the determination of the innovation and imitation values we considered one complete sequence of events.
This sequence of events can be repeated endlessly. Thus, the more general innovation and imitation values will be
V










. The same will happen with I











Once the innovation and imitation values are equalized, the factors associated with the repetitions of the sequence
will cancel each other out.






 = 2MrF + 2pxF(ET   ERD)   K(2rFrM + r2
F)
rM = r + ET
rF = rM + px,
Where rM is the risk adjusted discount rate of the monopolistic pro￿ts of innovators, and rF is




The previous proposition is consistent with existing literature that highlights the e￿ect of a low
interest rate, which increases the present value of monopolistic pro￿ts thus increasing the incentives
to innovate. In our model with two sectors this result is no longer obvious. A decline of the discount
rate increases the present value of pro￿ts in both innovative and imitative activities, with the e￿ect
on the former being larger than on the latter, thereby moving workers towards the innovation sector.
Proposition 2. An increase in the sampling rate, p, or in the government expenditure, x, or in the
￿ne, F, increases the share of the labor force allocated to R&D activities.






Given that the share of workers in the imitation sector is greater or equal than zero then
@ERD
@F > 0.





The equilibrium condition implies that the numerator is positive, and thus @ERD
@px > 0. Indeed,






px(ET+px+r) , which under Assumption 2 is clearly positive.
Corollary 1. Depending on the parameters, increases in the e￿ective sampling rate, px, or the ￿ne,
F, can have equivalent e￿ects on the incidence of R&D.
Proof. The results are derived from the following inequalities and assumption 1. A marginal change
in the ￿ne will have a larger e￿ect on the allocation of human capital to R&D than a marginal
increase in the sampling probability as long as the following inequalities hold:
3This implicit di￿erentiation implies di￿erentiating both sides of the equilibrium condition with respect to the
variable of interest. ERD should be considered a function of the parameters of the model. And as explained in the








However, governments may prefer to increase the ￿ne rather than the expenditure associated
with the sampling rate due to budget constraints. In general, as stated in the previous proposition
proof, this alternative will be preferable for low levels of imitation.
The following proposition concerns the e￿ect of changes in human capital endowments on the
share allocated to R&D. The relationship has no obvious sign under the model assumptions. This is
due to the fact that human capital can move into either innovation or imitation activities. Thus, the
following proposition establishes the conditions under which a marginal increase in human capital
endowment increases innovation.
Proposition 3. An increase in total human capital, depending on the parameters, may or may not
increase the share of human capital allocated to the R&D sector.







The numerator is composed of a positive and a negative term, hence the sign of this derivative is
unde￿ned, but there is an F that makes this derivative positive. That is, if there are no incentives
for innovation, additional human capital moves into the imitation sector. The derivative of human








Furthermore, there is an F such that @ERD
@ET = 0, and for F > F the derivative with respect to human




Proposition 4. The e￿ect of human capital on R&D is increasing in px and F.
Proof. The previous proposition stated that the derivative of human capital dedicated to R&D with








Since the level of human capital in R&D activities depends on institutions, and GDP depends
positively on total human capital, we can derive the following corollaries about the nonlinear e￿ects
of human capital and IPRs on the R&D share in the GDP. The R&D share in GDP is de￿ned as
RD
Y = wERD
wET 5 1. The following corollary is obtained by di￿erentiating this expression:
10Corollary 2. The share of R&D in GDP increases with the sampling probability, p, or with the
government expenditure, x, or with the amount of the ￿ne, F. These variables show decreasing
marginal returns. These relationships are non-linear.
Proof. The respective derivatives can be expressed as functions of the derivatives of human capital



















































Corollary 3. Depending on the parameters, the share of R&D in GDP may or may not increase
with total human capital, and this relationship is non-linear.
Proof. The respective derivatives can be expressed as functions of the derivatives of human capital
in R&D divided by total human capital, hence it is straightforward to show that the e￿ects of F



























Corollary 4. If E > px + r the cross derivatives of share of R&D in GDP with respect to total
human capital and enforcement of IPRs, px, and F are positive.




















Corollaries 1-4 suggest that under nonrestrictive assumptions there is non-separability of IPRs
and human capital accumulation in the determination of the incidence of R&D. These relationships
are also non-linear and the impact of IPRs protection is positive whereas the impact of human capital
11is positive under particular conditions. Thus, in our empirical section we depart from traditional
estimation of linear and separable functional form of the relationship between R&D, IPRs, and
human capital.
3 Empirical Evidence
The theoretical model provides testable hypotheses. In brief, we expect that international di￿er-
ences in R&D as a share of GDP depend on human capital, intellectual property rights (including
enforcement), and non-linear interactions between these variables. The econometric models (dis-
cussed below) that assess the validity of our theoretical predictions rely on data on R&D, educational
attainment, and IPRs that are commonly used in empirical applications.
3.1 Data and identi￿cation
The historical R&D series from 1960-2000 were compiled by Lederman and Saenz (2005) from vari-
ous sources, but the data are derived ultimately from national surveys that use a common de￿nition
of R&D expenditures that includes fundamental and applied research as well as experimental de-
velopment.4 The data thus include not only investments in labor and materials needed to conduct
basic scienti￿c research in advanced countries, but also corresponding investments in the adoption
and adaptation of existing technologies often thought more germane to developing countries. The
series were constructed from data published by UNESCO, the OECD, the Ibero American Science
and Technology Indicators Network (RICYT) and the Taiwan Statistical Data Book. The Lederman
and Saenz data were updated to the latest year available for 2000-2004 from the UNESCO web site.
We work with ￿ve year averages of R&D as a share of GDP from 1960-2004.
The educational attainment data come from Barro and Lee (2001). More speci￿cally, we use the
variable on the average years of education of the adult population (25-64 years) as the proxy of total
human capital. These data are available every ￿ve years, beginning in 1960, thus corresponding to
the initial year of each ￿ve-year average of the R&D variable.
We use the aggregate Ginarte-Park IPR index (Ginarte and Park 1997), which is the simple
average of ￿ve component indexes concerning each country’s IPR laws in terms of its coverage and
enforcement. The index’s ￿ve components are the coverage of patent laws across seven industries,
membership in three international agreements, loss of protection due to three potential reasons
4See UNESCO Statistical Yearbook (1980) p. 742. The de￿nition of R&D is the same across secondary sources,
including the OECD, Ibero American Science and Technology Indicators Network (RICYT), World Bank, and Taiwan
Statistical Yearbook. All these organizations follow the de￿nitions provided by the Frascati Manual with the 2002
edition published by the OECD being its latest incarnation. For the purposes of this study, it is worth reproducing
here the de￿nition of experimental development, which is systematic work, drawing on existing knowledge gained from
research and/or practical experience, which is directed to producing new materials, products or devices, to installing
new processes, systems and services, or to improving substantially those already produced or installed (OECD 2002,
p. 30).
12(namely working requirements, compulsory licensing, and revocation of patents), three types of
enforcement mechanisms, and the duration of patents relative to international standards. 5 Each
component ranges between zero and one, and thus the composite index we use in the empirical
exercises also varies between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating stronger IPR protections and
enforcement. Summary descriptive statistics of the three variables and the list of 67 countries that
appear in our sample are reported in the Appendix.
Finally, the data on IPRs are available in ￿ve year intervals, with the updated data from 1960-
2000 available from Park’s web site.6 These data, like the educational attainment data, are thus also
available for the initial year of each ￿ve-year period in our estimation sample. And both variables
therefore can be treated as pre-determined or weakly exogenous with respect to the R&D variable
in a temporal sense. Moreover, the educational attainment variable re￿ects educational enrollment
decisions made roughly during ages 6-25, and therefore are unlikely to be due in a causal sense to
the share of R&D observed in the subsequent 4 years. The IPR index is largely a summary indicator
of the laws that establish the coverage and enforcement of IPR laws, which are the result of past
international negotiations and legislative activity. Consequently it is di￿cult to believe that the
index is caused by subsequent realizations of R&D.
3.2 Model speci￿cation
As mentioned, the theoretical model predicts that the relationship between R&D as a share of GDP
and human capital and IPRs can be characterized by a non-linear function. Under the expectation
of non-linear relationships, the ideal estimator would be a non-parametric estimator capable of esti-
mating local derivatives over the data sample. Unfortunately, non-parametric estimators commonly
used in empirical analyses tend to breakdown in the presence of multi-variate relationships and
especially in the presence of ￿xed e￿ects.7 A more tractable alternative is to apply linear estimators
to ￿exible functional forms using Taylor or Fourier approximations to non-linear functions of un-
known form. The disadvantage of this general approach is the well known ￿curse of dimensionality,￿
whereby the addition of higher-order polynomials or trigonometric terms in linear functions reduces
the power of standard speci￿cation tests, such as the t-statistic, and thus we are unable to ascer-
tain the statistical signi￿cance of each element in the high-order functions. On the other hand, we
can apply standard F-tests to test the null hypothesis of insigni￿cant higher-order and interactive
terms in the chosen functions.8 We apply three econometric approaches to assess the existence of
5Regarding the enforcement mechanisms, the sub-index includes three de jure enforcement mechanisms: (a)
Preliminary (pre-trial) injunctions, (b) Contributory infringement, and (c) Burden of proof reversal (see Ginarte
and Park 1997, p. 287-88; and Park 2008).
6http://www.american.edu/cas/econ/faculty/park.htm
7See, for example, Stone (1980), White (1980) and Yatchew (2003).
8We thank Francisco Rodriguez of Wesleyan University for highlighting these econometric issues. See also his
paper on growth empirics, Rodriguez (2007).
13non-linearities among R&D, initial education, and initial de jure IPR.
3.2.1 Two-stage rolling regressions
The ￿rst approach entails a two-stage estimation procedure, which is purely descriptive. In the ￿rst
stage, we estimate the semi-elasticity of R&D over GDP with respect to (the natural logarithm
of) initial educational attainment, while controlling for country-speci￿c ￿xed e￿ects, over a moving
window of observations ranked by the initial IPR index. In turn we estimate the correlation between
the elasticities estimated in the ￿rst stage and each country’s level of educational attainment and
IPRs. Since the dependent variable in the second stage is not a precise statistic, but rather an
estimated elasticity, the standard errors of the second-stage estimations are bootstrapped. Also, it
is likely that the sample size of the window of observations can a￿ect the estimated elasticities, and
thus we report results from speci￿cations with various window sizes.
More formally, the regression model to be estimated over each window of a subset of observations






=  +   lnHKit 1 + i + t + "it (11)
HK is human capital observed in the initial year of each ￿ve-year period, as re￿ected in its t-1
subscript, i is the country ￿xed e￿ect, and t is time-period e￿ect.
Figure 1 shows the estimated coe￿cients over the number of interactions corresponding to a
rolling window of 60 observations.9 This preliminary evidence shows that, in fact, the semi-elasticity
of R&D over GDP with respect to educational attainment is generally positive, but it is clearly a
non-linear function. The relationship between R&D and human capital is unstable and rising with
the rank of the IPR index. Furthermore, the changes in the semi-elasticity seem to be discrete
and unpredictable. It is zero in the samples with the worst levels of IPRs, then abruptly rises in
the middle of sample, and stabilizes towards the end of the sample. These abrupt changes in the
relevant semi-elasticity are not due to abrupt changes in the IPR index as we move up the rankings
of IPRs. Considering that the each iteration involves a set of observations with increasing IPR
index, the slope of the curve in Figure 1 corresponds approximately to the cross derivative of R&D
share with respect to human capital and the IPR rank. Thus, we expect that this cross derivative
could be positive on average for the whole sample. In any case, we discuss the results from our
two-stage estimations further below.
9We excluded one observation from the data, namely for El Salvador in 1980, as the Lederman and Saenz data
had a value of 2.27% of GDP. This data point is consistent with the RICyT data, but it is impossibly high for a
poor developing economy, and there were no data points within ￿ve years of this observation. Estimations with this
observation also yielded notable unpredictable non-linearities. The corresponding graph is available from the authors
upon request. We are grateful to Bill Maloney and Edwin Goni for pointing out this outlier.
143.2.2 Formal linearity and separability tests
As mentioned, we study non-linearities in the R&D function by estimating polynomial expansions






= 0 + 1HKit 1 + 2IPRit 1 + 3HK2
it 1 + 4IPR2
it 1 + 5HKit 1IPRit 1 (12)
where subscripts i and t are countries and years. The null hypothesis that the function is linear
is:
3 = 4 = 5 = 0 (13)
In other words, for the function to be linear, the quadratic and interactive terms in equation
(11) need to be jointly zero. Equation (11) can be estimated with Ordinary Least Squares, and
a traditional F-test for joint signi￿cance of the relevant parameters can be applied to ascertain
whether the function is linear. In addition, the null hypothesis of the separability test concerns the
cross derivative:
5 = 0 (14)
The third order Taylor expansion includes additional terms, namely the cubic of each explanatory
variable and the interaction between the square of each explanatory variable and the other. Hence
the test for linearity would entail the F-test for the joint signi￿cance as in (11) above, but with the
additional terms included in the equality condition. Likewise, the separability test for the cubic
expansion would include the coe￿cients on the additional interactive terms.
As a preliminary step to explore the di￿erences across the linear, second order, third order
functional forms, Figure 2 contains graphs of the resulting ￿tted functions. The graphs show the
scatter plot of R&D over GDP as functions of the schooling variable. It is evident that the slope of
the function depends on the value of schooling for all functional forms, except the linear function.
Hence the discussion of the results includes an exploration of the average slope or e￿ect of the
explanatory variables on R&D over GDP for the global sample and for various regions (groups of
countries) when appropriate.10
10We also present econometric estimates that control for time dummies, which capture any period speci￿c e￿ects
that are common to all countries, such as variations in global interest rates.
154 Results
We discuss the three sets of results separately, starting with the descriptive two-stage estimations
with rolling windows of observations ranked by the IPR index variable. In turn, we discuss the
results from the second order, third order, and Fourier functional forms, with special attention
given to the tests of the null hypotheses of linearity and separability.
4.1 Suggestive evidence of non-linearities from two-stage estimations
Figure 1 shows the estimated quasi-elasticities linking R&D over GDP to the (log of) years of
schooling of the adult population, based on the ￿ve-year averages panel data discussed earlier.
Table 1 shows the results from the second-stage regressions, where the dependent variable is the
vector of quasi-elasticities estimated with the various windows of observations. That is, we used
windows of between 30 and 80 observations, as listed in the ￿rst row of the table. The level of
schooling itself seems to be signi￿cantly correlated with the estimated quasi elasticities from the
￿rst stage estimation, thus suggesting that the e￿ect of schooling is not linear. In addition, this
suggestive evidence also seems to show that the level of the IPR index also tends to a￿ect the quasi
elasticities of R&D over GDP with respect to schooling, but these results are less robust across the
window sizes. This type of sensitivity is expected, since we do not know what would be the optimal
window size for this type of estimation. Nevertheless, there is su￿cient evidence of non-linearities
and perhaps of non-separability to turn our attention to the formal tests of linearity and separability.
4.2 Formal tests of linearity and separability based on second-order and third-
order functional forms
Table 2 contains the results from random e￿ects, ￿xed-e￿ects, and time-e￿ects speci￿cations of the
second order polynomial functional form. The table includes the coe￿cient estimates, the p-values
of the null hypotheses of linearity and separability, as well as the Hausmann speci￿cation test for
equality of the random- and ￿xed-e￿ects estimations.
As expected, few coe￿cients are statistically di￿erent from zero. In this regard, it is actually
surprising that the interactive term between schooling and the IPR index is highly signi￿cant across
all speci￿cations. Thus we can safely reject the null of separability. Moreover, the p-value of the
corresponding F-test safely rejects the null of linearity. That is, we cannot reject the possibility that
the squared terms in the model are jointly signi￿cant, although each one of them does not appear
to be individually signi￿cant. The curse of dimensionality comes out loud and clear, even in the
second-order functional form.
The lower panel of Table 2 shows the average derivatives for the global sample and for the
geographic regions. As mentioned earlier, we cannot know the con￿dence interval around each
16average derivative. But it is interesting to note that all derivatives are positive and seem to be
consistently estimated across the various speci￿cations. The High-Income countries tend to have
the highest marginal e￿ects of schooling on R&D e￿ort as a share of GDP.
Table 3 presents the speci￿cation tests for the null of linearity and separability, as well as the
test of equivalence of the random- and ￿xed-e￿ects speci￿cations of the third-order functional form.
It also reports the average ￿rst derivatives of the R&D over GDP with respect to schooling, as well
as the average cross derivatives (i.e., how the ￿rst derivative changes with marginal changes in the
IPR index).
The results suggest, again, that we can safely reject the null of linearity. The test of separability
is more mixed, with the ￿xed-e￿ects speci￿cations unable to reject separability. However, the Haus-
mann tests for equivalence between the random- and ￿xed-e￿ects speci￿cations suggest the more
e￿cient random-e￿ects estimation is preferable, as we cannot reject that the set of coe￿cients from
the random- and ￿xed-e￿ects estimations are statistically similar. Since the preferred random-e￿ects
speci￿cation rejects separability, we conclude that in the third-order polynomial function there is
evidence that the underlying function is both non-linear with potentially important interactions
between IPRs and schooling. In this regard, the estimates of the average cross-derivatives suggest
that the marginal e￿ects of schooling on R&D expenditures as a share of GDP is positively a￿ected
by the level of IPR protection as the model predicts. This result appears for all regions of the
world, but the point estimates tend to be larger for developing countries than for the High-Income
countries.
As a robustness check we estimated various Fourier trigonometric expansions of the R&D func-
tion. These results, which are available upon request, also rejected the null of separability of human
capital and IPRs.11
11The Fourier expansion implemented is the Taylor second order expansion but with additional trigonometric terms.
The advantage of this speci￿cation is that the resulting functions are more ￿exible. More formally, following Yatchew

























where the linear part of the equation is   X . The z’s are our two explanatory variables. The second and third
terms in (14) are the terms from the second order expansion. The k’s are vectors whose elements are integers with
absolute values summing to a number k less than a pre-speci￿ed value K*. Given a value of K* and J, the parameter
vector can be estimated by OLS. The choices of K* and J are somewhat arbitrary. In our case, K*=3. The total
number of terms in the expansion is supposed to grow with sample size. In practice, researchers look at the ratio of
the total number of parameters in the expansion to the number of observations. We can obtain a restricted estimator
by restricting the coe￿cients on the terms involving interactions between di￿erent z variables to equal zero. Thus,
the separability test for the Fourier expansion is the test used for the second order expansion but including the
trigonometric parameters in the set to be tested for joint signi￿cance. There is not linearity test speci￿c to the
Fourier expansion. In any case, the point is that the trigonometric terms add ￿exibility to the function, but also
add complexity. Tests for the cases of K=2, K=3, J=1 and J=2 rejected the null of separability at less than the 5%
con￿dence level.
175 Concluding Remarks
We extended the model by Aghion and Howitt (1992) to take into account the role of intellectual-
property institutions in the process of innovation. Our model consists of two sectors that operate
simultaneously, one relying on costly imitation and the other on innovation. Firms or entrepreneurs
decide endogenously whether to participate in innovative or imitative activities. The enforcement
of intellectual property rights a￿ects the incentives of labor to move between the two sectors. That
is, institutions determine the risk-adjusted relative discount rate between employment in the two
sectors. A second theoretical result is that an increase in the endowment of human capital increases
the share of labor devoted to R&D activities under strong protection of IPRs.
Perhaps more importantly, the model predicts that aggregate patterns of the R&D shares across
countries depend on complex interactions between IPRs and human capital. In spite of these
complex interactions, the model also predicts, under fairly nonrestrictive assumptions, that IPRs
provide incentives for the allocation of human capital into R&D activities. Economies with lax
IPRs may not experience increases in the incidence of R&D over GDP as a result of increases
in the stock of human capital. The model suggests that a minimum level of protection of IPRs
can ensure that human capital accumulation increases the share of R&D. Thus, the model yields
a testable prediction, namely that the share of R&D in GDP is a non-linear function of IPRs
and human capital. While existing theories predict di￿erential e￿ects of IPRs on poor versus rich
countries, the existing empirical literature has focused exclusively on log-linear functions of R&D
determinants (e.g., Varsakelis 2001; Chen and Puttitanum 2005). The analyses here thus contributed
to both micro-founded theory and evidence by highlighting an ignored aspect of the role of IPRs as
institutions shaping incentives for human capital to be allocated to R&D within countries.
The empirical section of the paper focused on international data on R&D shares of GDP, years
of schooling of the adult population, and the Ginarte and Park (1997) data on de jure intellectual
property rights. The data on educational attainment and IPRs were safely treated as being pre-
determined. Preliminary and descriptive estimations of the quasi-elasticity of R&D over GDP as a
function of schooling suggested that in fact the data do seem to behave as if the underlying data
generation process were unpredictably non-linear, and highlighting a new stylized fact: at low levels
of IPRs, marginal increases in the stock of education have negligible e￿ects on R&D.
We estimated basic models of the determinants of R&D expenditures as a share of GDP to
test for non-linearities and interactions between the schooling of the labor force and the quality
and enforcement of intellectual property rights, while also controlling for unobserved international
heterogeneity with country speci￿c e￿ects. Non-parametric estimators cannot estimate such func-
tions, and thus the applied literature has focused on polynomial and trigonometric approximations
to non-linear functional forms.
18The estimation of second-order, third-order and Fourier polynomial functions allowed us to test
the validity of the null of linearity and separability in the R&D functions. The preponderance of
the evidence suggests that we can reject linearity and separability, thus lending credence to the
theoretical model. Moreover, the point estimates we obtain con￿rm the positive marginal e￿ects of
human capital and IPRs on R&D as well as the signi￿cance of their interactions. It is noteworthy
that the e￿ect of education on R&D e￿ort can depend on intellectual property rights across countries
of diverse levels of development, even after controlling for time-invariant heterogeneity.
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20Appendix
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
R&D/GDP (%) 228 1.091 0.915 0.001 4.399
Average Years of Schooling 228 6.502 2.716 0.308 12.247
IPR Index 228 2.742 0.910 0.330 4.857
List of Countries with Regional Identi￿ers
1. ARGENTINA LAC 2. AUSTRALIA HI 3. AUSTRIA HI 4. BELGIUM HI 5. BOLIVIA LAC
6. BRAZIL LAC 7. CAMEROON SHA 8. CANADA HI 9. CHILE LAC 10. CHINA P.REP.
EAP 11. COLOMBIA LAC 12. COSTA RICA LAC 13. CYPRUS MENA 14. DENMARK HI 15.
ECUADOR LAC 16. EGYPT MENA 17. EL SALVADOR LAC 18. FINLAND HI 19. FRANCE
HI 20. GERMANY HI 21. GHANA SHA 22. GREECE HI 23. GUATEMALA LAC 24. GUYANA
LAC 25. HONDURAS LAC 26. HONG KONG EAP 27. HUNGARY ECA 28. INDIA SA 29.
INDONESIA EAP 30. IRAN MENA 31. IRELAND HI 32. ISRAEL MENA 33. ITALY HI 34.
JAMAICA LAC 35. JAPAN HI 36. JORDAN MENA 37. KENYA SHA 38. MALAWI SHA 39.
MAURITIUS SHA 40. MEXICO LAC 41. NETHERLANDS HI 42. NEW ZEALAND HI 43.
NORWAY HI 44. PAKISTAN SA 45. PANAMA LAC 46. PERU LAC 47. PHILIPPINES EAP
48. PORTUGAL HI 49. SENEGAL SHA 50. SINGAPORE EAP 51. SOUTH AFRICA SHA 52.
SOUTH KOREA EAP 53. SPAIN HI 54. SRI LANKA SA 55. SUDAN SHA 56. SWEDEN HI 57.
SWITZERLAND HI 58. THAILAND EAP 59. TRINIDAD/TOBAGO LAC 60. TUNISIA MENA
61. TURKEY ECA 62. UGANDA SHA 63. UNITED KINGDOM HI 64. UNITED STATES HI
65. URUGUAY LAC 66. VENEZUELA LAC 67. ZAMBIA SHA
21Table 1: Second Stage Regression Estimates of the Determinants of the R&D/GDP Quasi-Elasticity
with Respect to Schooling across Sample-Window Sizes
Sample-Window Size
30 40 50 60 70 80
Average Years of Schooling 0.134 0.032 0.051 0.092 0.114 0.111
[0.000]*** [0.278] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Intellectual Property Rights Index 0.064 0.289 0.18 0.059 -0.002 0.015
[0.492] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.926] [0.411]
Obs. 165 155 145 135 125 115
R-Squared 0.449 0.71 0.821 0.872 0.933 0.959
Notes: Fixed E￿ects were included in the First Stage. Variables were calculated as the country mean
for each window. The original units are 5-year averages of the R&D/GDP variable, and the value of the
schooling and IPR index variables in the initial year of each 5-year period. The data cover the period
from 1960-2004, but the panel is unbalanced. P-values from bootstrapped standard errors for the null
appear within brackets; p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
22Table 2: Regression Results for the Second-Order Polynomial Function
No FE FE RE FE&TE RE&TE
Average Years of Schooling (H) -0.147 -0.143 -0.151 -0.195 -0.152
[0.060]* [0.144] [0.039]** [0.105] [0.045]**
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Index 0.095 0.064 0.153 0.079 0.156
[0.671] [0.856] [0.514] [0.825] [0.512]
Schooling Squared -0.003 0.010 0.008 0.013 0.008
[0.663] [0.154] [0.162] [0.102] [0.184]
IPR Squared -0.111 -0.085 -0.101 -0.073 -0.090
[0.056]* [0.175] [0.051]* [0.258] [0.088]*
Schooling*IPR 0.127 0.074 0.086 0.064 0.080
[0.000]*** [0.020]** [0.002]*** [0.053]* [0.005]***
Obs 228 228 228 228 228
R-Squared 0.555 0.380 0.406
R-Squared: Overall 0.519 0.538 0.518 0.549
Linearity Test: P-Value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.000
Separability Test: P-Value 0.000 0.020 0.002 0.053 0.005
FE=RE: P-Value 0.023 0.997






World Sample 0.165 0.198 0.189 0.145 0.171
East Asia and the Paci￿c 0.117 0.152 0.142 0.100 0.126
Europe and Central Asia 0.085 0.089 0.085 0.034 0.071
High-Income Countries 0.232 0.281 0.270 0.230 0.248
Latin America/Caribbean 0.075 0.115 0.104 0.065 0.090
Middle East/N. Africa 0.155 0.173 0.167 0.118 0.150
South Asia 0.084 0.066 0.065 0.007 0.052
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.202 0.114 0.128 0.042 0.110
Notes: P-values for the null appear within brackets; p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
FE=Fixed E￿ects; RE=Random E￿ects; TE=Time E￿ects. The Regional groups are those of the
World Bank. Derivatives are calculated at regional means.
23Table 3: Regression Results for the Third-Order Polynomial Function
Speci￿cation Test No FE FE RE FE&TE RE&TE
Linearity Test: P-Value 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.000
Separability Test: P-Value 0.000 0.261 0.016 0.315 0.014
FE=RE: P-Value 0.348 0.991
Obs 228 228 228 228 228






World Sample 0.230 0.247 0.231 0.172 0.201
East Asia and the Paci￿c 0.170 0.192 0.179 0.117 0.149
Europe and Central Asia 0.062 0.070 0.069 -0.012 0.035
High-Income Countries 0.253 0.302 0.280 0.225 0.241
Latin America/Caribbean 0.106 0.138 0.127 0.064 0.097
Middle East/N. Africa 0.213 0.215 0.204 0.139 0.174
South Asia -0.001 0.000 0.008 -0.083 -0.025
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.106 0.049 0.082 0.014 0.089






World Sample 0.133 0.073 0.081 0.063 0.071
East Asia and the Paci￿c 0.148 0.084 0.091 0.074 0.086
Europe and Central Asia 0.176 0.109 0.118 0.119 0.132
High-Income Countries 0.101 0.046 0.054 0.024 0.028
Latin America/Caribbean 0.160 0.093 0.097 0.081 0.096
Middle East/N. Africa 0.144 0.083 0.092 0.082 0.091
South Asia 0.188 0.122 0.132 0.145 0.157
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.184 0.127 0.148 0.189 0.192
Note: Derivatives are calculated at the regional means of the relevant variables.
24Figure 1. The Marginal-Effects Coefficient of log(Human Capital) Depends on the Ranking of 
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